I. Introduction
Much has been written in the literature on the subject of money in politics. While in no way is there a grand consensus on the true power of campaign spending in election results, there have been some strong hypotheses proposed. Jacobson, while admitting his model is imperfect, contends that challenger spending is the only money significantly influencing elections (Jacobson 1978 (Jacobson , 1985 (Jacobson , 1990 . Many others have proposed additions to his basic model in an attempt to explain the apparently illogical assertion of incumbent spending insignificance (Green and Krasno 1988 , Abramowitz 1988 , Gerber 1998 . The inconclusive results are that incumbent spending may or may not matter, but at most has a smaller marginal impact than challenger spending 12 .
The glaring holes left in the literature are the assumed policy conclusions drawn concerning campaign finance laws. The implications supposed are that laws which extract money out of elections, such as contribution limits, disproportionately harm challengers while laws that inject money into elections disproportionately help challengers (Jacobson 1978 , Thomas 1989 , Gerber 1998 . The question no one asked, until Eom and Gross addressed it, was, "Do campaign finance laws evenly affect candidates for elected office" (Eom and Gross 2006) ?
II. Review of Previous Literature
Prior to the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 there was no effective way to gather data about elections in the United States. Researchers would collect small 1 Several researchers have proposed that the actual marginal effect of incumbent spending is somewhere between have that of challenger spending and equal to challenger spending (Green and Krasno 1988 , Gerber 1998 . 2 Levitt contends that while the marginal effects of incumbent spending and challenger spending are nearly identical they are so small as to be trivial (Levitt 1994) .
pieces of information about individual races, or limited information about state elections (many states had disclosure laws by this time, though most were limited). But, no one could collect enough data to make any statistical claims about money and elections. The
FECA and its accompanying amendments in 1974 not only created the Federal Elections
Commission and set contribution limits, but also required uniform full disclosure of all contributions over $100 and all expenditures in all federal elections.
This required reporting provided researchers with approximately 471 observations every two years between the US House of Representatives and the Senate. While there was a steadily growing literature in the 60's and 70's, it wasn't until a few election cycles of data had been collected that effective analysis of spending in elections on a national scale could take place (Jacobson, 1978 ). In simple terms, the more incumbents spend, the worse they do; the reason is that they raise and spend money in direct proportion to the magnitude of the electoral threat posed by the challenger. (Jacobson, 1978) .
The endogeneity issue he posed provides a serious hurdle to any potential model.
If one assumes that incumbents have the ability to raise and spend an unlimited amount of money (or at least unlimited compared to any challenger), then any OLS model estimates are going to be biased and inconsistent (Jacobson, 1978) . It is only logical, he supposed, that the only consistent model would be a 2SLS regression. Since the current assumption was that incumbents chose spending in some proportional response to challengers, a perfect instrumental variable was readily provided in challenger spending.
Accounting for some other instruments, like experience, incumbent leadership positions (such as whip, leader, speaker, etc.) he determined that while incumbent spending is not significant to the election outcome, challenger spending is very significant (Jacobson, 1978) . This is a clear break from all previous literature which had established spending as significant, but had attributed that effect as even across both incumbents and challengers 3 .
Beyond establishing the precedent that only challenger spending matters, Jacobson identified several other important assumptions and considerations that future research would need to address. The paramount issue is that of diminishing marginal returns to spending. He argued that regardless of the evidence, the shear fact that no candidate can ever earn more than 100 percent of the vote means that at some point excess spending, even by the challenger, will have no marginal effect (Jacobson, 1978) .
What he does not do is identify the appropriate way to deal with that apparent curvature.
While one would assume some log form, he contends that a semi-log transformation would establish too steep of a curve (Jacobson, 1978) .
He also established the policy assumption that any policy which increased money raised and spent in elections would help challengers, as any increased challenger spending would provide far greater benefit than increased incumbent spending (Jacobson, 1978) .
The tone set by Jacobson is continued for the next several years. Caldeira and Patterson (1982) looked at state legislature elections in California and Iowa. While they chose an OLS model, which Jacobson contends is biased, their results are very similar to his. They find that incumbent spending is not significant in the election outcome while challenger spending is significant (Caldeira and Patterson, 1982) 4 .
While they deviate from previous methods in several ways, like not using 2SLS, breaking down candidates into parties and also looking at general party election results, their primary break from Jacobson was attempting to model the diminishing marginal returns of spending 5 . Their OLS model is composed of Republican spending, Democrat spending and the squared spending of both candidates (Caldeira and Patterson, 1982) .
Their results show that the quadratic variables are significant, supporting the assumption of diminishing returns to spending.
That same year Patterson (1982) made the first thorough analysis of gubernatorial elections. In looking at the overall election results, he considered three primary areas of predictor variables; partisan strength, incumbency and spending, with partisan strength measured as the party's most recent presidential candidate's vote share. The benefit he contended in looking at governors is the apparent limited effect of incumbency. While there is obviously a benefit to being an incumbent governor in an election, he noted that 4 They also use a similar approach to Shepard (1977) , in dividing candidates by party. While they find that both Democrat and Republican spending is significant, unlike Shepard, they do support his general conclusion in that Republican spending is much more impactful than Democrat spending. 5 Caldeira and Patterson also begin to approach effective ways to include party status into the model. While their approach is crude and mostly ineffective, we should note the importance of beginning to address the issue as it will become more crucial in the future.
incumbent reelection rates have not changed since the early 1900s (Patterson, 1982) 6 .
That is in contrast to the steadily increasing reelection rates for US Congressmen and Senators. He theorized that this should provide a 'cleaner' field for analyzing spending (Patterson, 1982) .
While his data consists of only 34 races in 1978, it does provide some interesting insight. Regressing partisan strength, incumbency (measured by years in office) and log spending per voter he found a significant relationship in spending (Patterson, 1982) . This result gives a few pieces of information. First, it supports the assumption of diminishing marginal returns. Second, it again seems to show a higher impact of Republican spending than Democrat spending 7 .
Between 1980 and 1985 Jacobson published a series of books and articles in which he expanded his previous research to encompass the increased data collected during each US House election cycle (Jacobson, 1981 (Jacobson, , 1985 . Summarizing that work in a 1985 article he reaffirmed his previous arguments. His primary contention is that looking at all US House election from 1972 through 1982 challenger spending was highly significant and incumbent spending was trivial 8 . This result held when he looked at each individual election cycle and when he looked at the aggregated decade of data (Jacobson, 1985) . The secondary conclusion he made is that limitations in statistical methods mean 6 This assumption may not be entirely accurate. Tompkins (1984) looked at gubernatorial races from 1947-1981 and found that while it appeared incumbency benefits had not changed, the incumbency benefit had actually shifted. Incumbents appear to have gained stronger benefits in their first reelection campaign over time while actually having tougher times in subsequent elections. This may cause Patterson's use of years in office for incumbency to be inconsistent, as it may also have diminishing marginal returns. 7 While the implication of this result is not clear, it seems that one possible explanation is that Democrat candidates begin to experience diminishing marginal returns at a lower level of spending than Republicans. The reason for this is not evident. 8 Though he did not stress this result, he often found incumbent spending to be negative and either significant or not significant. Using a 2SLS model he did obtain a positive effect, but that effect was never significant (Jacobson 1985) .
he must be wrong in his primary assumption. The logic to this conclusion is relatively simple. If there was absolutely no benefit to incumbent spending, as the regressions show, then why would incumbents spend a total of hundreds of millions of dollars over the data time period? His concern is noted clearly when he wrote
If incumbents really gain nothing by spending money in campaigns, ironies abound. Incumbents spend defensively and reactively, but pointlessly; the doubling of their real spending over the past decade has merely compounded the waste. The unpleasant work of fundraising which members of Congress complain of so passionately is not even necessary. Most of whatever influence PACs may enjoy must be based on the illusion of incumbents do not really need PAC contributions. It is not easy to believe that irrationality is so pervasive; alternative explanations need to be considered. (Jacobson, 1985) Since this strange result came out of both his OLS and his 2SLS models, he decided that there was simply no way to correctly model the endogenous nature of incumbent spending. While there must be some minimal level of incumbent spending per challenger spending simply to counteract campaign ads, there was no way to measure it (Jacobson, 1985) 9 .
In response to the challenge Jacobson leveled, that the simultaneity could not be measured, Donald Green and Jonathan Krasno created a 2SLS model that they claim refuted Jacobson's assertions (Green and Krasno, 1988) . The pair agrees with Jacobson's statements, in that there must be some benefit to incumbent spending. They sum up their reasoning by claiming one of two underlying truths explains Jacobson's regression results. The first option is that there are ulterior motives to incumbent 9 Over this five year time period, Jacobson wrote three books, each of which obviously covered a larger topic area than just spending and election results. He discusses and analyzes (with both quantitative and qualitative approaches) various areas as the benefits of incumbency, historical trends in campaign strategy and advertising, and so on. While they are fascinating and important in the field of political campaigns, they are not applicable to campaign finance research and are therefore not discussed in this paper.
spending, such as deterring future challenges, or that incumbents are so desperate as to spend even though they receive littler marginal benefit (Green and Krasno, 1988) . If that is not the underlying motive to spend, which the two say is highly likely, then the only other alternative is that Jacobson's modeling was wrong (Green and Krasno, 1988) .
Believing the latter of the two options, they determined there must be a model that can at least approximate the endogenous spending to give an more accurate picture of spending as a whole.
Green and Krasno chose to replicate Jacobson's analysis of the 1978
Congressional election cycle, which was published in his 1980 book Money in
Congressional Elections (cited in Green and Krasno, 1988) . There were three issues that they identified as flawed in the model chosen by Jacobson. The first was the lack of a measure of candidate quality, the second was the imposition of a linear functional form on the regression, and third was the lack of appropriate accommodation for the endogenous incumbent spending variable (Green and Krasno, 1988) . As probably one of the greatest contributions to the body of literature, the concept of effectively measuring candidate quality is one that had not been discussed prior to this article 10 . For the purposes of this research they combined several factors into the candidate quality variable, looking at previous offices held, celebrity status and experience running for office (Green and Krasno, 1988) . The resulting numerical variable ranged from 0 to 8, with 8 being the highest quality. They argued that quality is important on many levels.
On its face value, it is logical to assume that a candidate of higher quality would have an easier time winning votes. For this reason it should be included as a direct predictor variable in any model. But, more subtly, they argued that candidate quality is also an instrument for spending, addressing what they see as an inadequacy in dealing with the simultaneity problem in Jacobson's model. While the rational is not intuitive, they show that it is rational to assume candidates with higher quality will have an easier time fund raising, and will therefore spend more money (Green and Krasno, 1988) .
In addressing their contention with Jacobson's linear parameterization, they suggest imposing a log transformation on challenger spending to deal with diminishing marginal returns (Green and Krasno, 1988) . This is not entirely against previous convention (Jacobson, 1978) . They agree with Jacobson's assertion that any possible transformation would be either too restrictive or not restrictive enough. Their rational for including log spending was that while it is not perfect, it is a comparably better fit than the linear form (Green and Krasno, 1988) .
The results that Green and Krasno report are in stark contrast to the default positions the literature had taken for the preceding decade. They find that through a 2SLS procedure, using quality, challenger spending and incumbents previous election spending as instruments, incumbent spending is indeed significant (Green and Krasno, 1988) . They contended not only that incumbent spending impacted the election, but also that challenger spending reached diminishing marginal returns at much lower levels than incumbents.
In 1990, Jacobson directly refuted Green and Krasno. The crux of his paper is that the simultaneity problem pertaining to incumbent spending is far more complex than they assumed it to be (Jacobson, 1990) . In oversimplifying the problem they created a biased and inconsistent model (Abramowitz, N.d. as cited in Jacobson, 1990 Even if they did choose to transform both spending variables evenly, he contended, imposing a log transformation is far to restrictive (Jacobson, 1978 (Jacobson, , 1985 (Jacobson, , 1990 . If one were to impose diminishing returns he believes something like a Box-Cox method would provide a less generic and better fitting curve (Jacobson, 1990) 12 .
To 1980, but not for the other three elections (Jacobson, 1990) . The story he tells to explain this fact is simple. He agrees that incumbent spending must have some positive impact on vote share (even though this effect is not measurable through his proposed model).
But, if the effect of incumbent spending was anywhere near that of challenger's, as Green and Krasno estimated them to be approximately equal, then incumbents would never lose (Jacobson, 1990) . One fact which was assumed by nearly all the authors for the previous several decades, including Green and Krasno, is that incumbents have the potential to raise unlimited amounts of money compared to their challengers. If this really was true, and no one has argued to the contrary, then incumbents could always just match their challengers spending by some ratio, like 2:1 or 3:1 and they would always win (Jacobson, 1985 (Jacobson, , 1990 ).
The conclusion Jacobson draws from his analysis of Green and Krasno's work is that their model does not adequately compensate for the assumptions they argue must be made (Jacobson, 1990 ). While they model for diminishing returns, they do so in an unbalanced and inefficient way. While they control for simultaneity, they do not compensate for the inherent model bias. And, while he commends them for further inclusion of candidate quality, he points out that inclusion, by their own admission, does not impact the results of the model (Jacobson, 1990, Green and Krasno, 1988 ).
Green and Krasno directly challenged Jacobson's claims in the same issue of the
American Journal of Political Science. Concerning the proper method of handling the simultaneity spending problem, they argued that their approach was not biased (Green and Krasno, 1990) . They concur with Jacobson and Abramowitz in the fact that inclusion of previous election incumbent spending as an instrument would cause bias if it were correlated with omitted variables which impacted the dependent variable, vote share. The problem they pointed out is that the only omitted variable Abramowitz claimed was correlated was previous challenger strength (Abramowitz, 1989) . Green and Krasno argue it did not meet the biased criteria as previous challenger strength has no impact on the current election's vote (Green and Krasno, 1990 ).
In response to Jacobson's critic of the unbalanced log transformation, they claim that it is not unbalanced. They contended that while it was logical to try to model incumbent diminishing returns, there is no evidence to suggest the incumbents in their sample spent enough to incur those decreasing returns (Green and Krasno, 1990) . They concede that future elections may see incumbent spending levels to justify inclusion of log transformations, but not the 1978 data with which they were working 13 .
The third major argument Jacobson made was that their model did not hold when extended to multiple time periods (Jacobson, 1990) . Their counter claim is that it does.
While they cannot provide an exact explanation, they believe he must have incorrectly replicated their model 14 . When they extrapolate their analysis across the same elections they claim significance in incumbent spending in each election (Green and Krasno, 1990) . Taking the process one step further, they aggregated all the elections from 1976-1986 and found reaffirmation of their original findings.
In addition to refuting Jacobson, they provide a basic rationale for choosing their model. Looking at the marginal benefits of spending, their model allows not only for analysis of challenger and incumbent marginal effects, but also of challenger marginals given their quality (Green and Krasno, 1990 ). What they found was the average challenger has a marginal benefit of approximately four while incumbents have two 15 .
They agree that challenger spending is much more effective, but no where near the extent that incumbent spending is trivial (Green and Krasno, 1990) . The added benefit they see from including a multinomial quality variable allows for marginal analysis given a quality level 16 . For example, a challenger who possess a quality of seven 17 sees a marginal benefit of nearly 6, a 50% improvement over the average candidate (Green and Krasno, 1990 ).
In essence, Green and Krasno claim that there is plenty of room to debate the merits of functional forms to capture diminishing returns, quality and simultaneity. But that doesn't mean they should be ignored, or that the smaller impact of incumbent spending means it is unimportant.
As previously mentioned it had been a long standing assumption in the literature that incumbents can choose to raise as much money as they want (Jacobson, 1978 (Jacobson, , 1985 .
Box-Steffensmeier and Dow are the first to begin to question this long held belief. They point out that most campaign finance research has been done in the framework of the 'Chicago' model of regulation, implying that the political markets of influence clear (Box-Steffensmeier and Dow, 1992) . The dilemma they point out was that all the focus on the large national data, which was rather easily accessible doesn't meet this the conditions to have a perfect market. This was due to the fact that contribution limits have been in place since the beginning of the data collection. In this setting, where limits are imposed, incumbents may not actually be able to raise the funds they would choose to have to repel challengers (Box-Steffensmeier and Dow, 1992) . So, to test the assumptions developed in previous research, they felt it would be appropriate to find data from elections in which there were no contribution limits and see if the same principles hold 18 .
18 It would be appropriate to point out that any data used would have to come from elections in which limits were not imposed yet full disclosure was required. One could make an argument that this would inherently bias the results, allowing for the same types of artificial limitations on fund raising (incumbents may want more money but will not take it from groups they find objectionable). This issue is not directly addressed by the authors. Over the course of the development of campaign finance literature, several authors have discussed the need for a dynamic model analysis of campaign spending on voter choice (Ben-Zion and Eytan, 1974 , Jacobson, 1978 , 1985 . To do so would require 19 As the model does not include any measure for challenger fund raising or contributions (or for that matter, any individual election specific variable) the results are dubious at best. 20 This point is not clearly defined, but is supported when the authors gives support to previous authors like Jacobson when they claim that more money in elections helps challengers more than incumbents.
more than after-the-fact data on election spending. It would require some information collected from voters during the election, as money is being spent, leading up to the election. This would provide much needed insight into how money changes voters opinions before they go to the polls (Kenny and McBurnett, 1992) . While one prior analysis was attempted 21 , Kenny and McBurnett were the first to take an extensive look into one election to see how money played a roll.
The pair argued that while information can be gleaned from aggregate analysis, looking at an entire election's spending and resulting vote, there are still many unanswered questions that the regressions cannot answer (Kenny and McBurnett, 1992) . showed significance in challenger spending and no significance in incumbent spending (Kenny and McBurnett, 1992) 23 . Their contention was that this result is much stronger than previous statements (Jacobson, 1978 , 1985 , Caldeira and Patterson, 1982 While the primary purpose of Jacobson's 1990 paper was to refute Green and Krasno (1988) , he also spent time looking at polling data collected by ABC news during the 1988 election. Since the data and results are circumstantial, covering several races and lacking a level of depth, it is fair to assert Kenny and McBurnett conducted the first extensive study incorporating survey data with spending (Kenny and McBurnett, 1992) . 22 A three wave survey of 1500 residents of the district designed to gather a representative demographic sampling. Only the second and third waves were used, since the first did not ask about candidate preference. 23 The incumbent was Republican John Hiler and the challenger was Democrat Michael Barnes. Thomas, 1989) because it shows challenger spending to be significant during the election, effectively changing voters choice before they go to the polls.
The question of adjusting the analysis for candidate quality was addressed by Levitt in 1994 . What had been recognized by this point was that candidate quality needed to be included in at least some minimal way (Green and Krasno, 1988) . The rationale for this was the proven upward bias in challenger spending effectiveness, due to the fact high quality challengers who have a better chance of winning will raise more money (Snyder, 1990) . The problem, as Levitt points out, is there is no reasonable way to quantify quality. Jacobson had given it a dummy coding of one for political experience and zero for none (Jacobson, 1978 (Jacobson, , 1985 , while Green and Krasno had created an intricate scale of 0 to 8 (Green and Krasno, 1988) . Levitt argues these all fall short. Quality is an all encompassing feature that involves more than previous offices held (Levitt, 1994) . It involves charisma, speaking ability, intelligence and a host of immeasurable qualities. So Levitt decided to eliminate the quality question by weeding it out of the data set (Levitt, 1994) .
To do this he simply used only Congressional elections in which the same candidates meet each other multiple times 24 . The effect of this data selection is candidate quality becomes much less of a biasing issue, since the primary difference between the elections will be the amount of money spent (Levitt, 1994) . One might say this is a more pure sampling for the purposes of determining significance of campaign spending 25 . The results of the OLS analysis with district specific fixed effects show again that spending is 24 Intuition would say this would be a rare occurrence, but oddly enough between 1972-1990 there were 633 elections which meet this criteria (Levitt, 1994) . 25 Levitt admits this would be a poor data set to use in determining the effects of incumbency, party or any other effect. But, since he is only concerned with spending, it is perfect (Levitt, 1994) .
significant. The divergence from previous literature is that it has only slightly positive marginal effects, to the point that an additional $100,000 spent by a candidate would earn them an extra .33 percent vote share (Levitt, 1994 ). Levitt's findings also support Green and Krasno, showing that while challenger spending is marginally more productive than incumbent spending, the difference is small. For the purposes of a policy discussion, he argued this means campaign finance limitations do not hurt challengers and any effort to increase campaign spending (such as increasing limits or public funding) would be misplaced as they would have no effect on the election outcome (Levitt, 1994) .
In 1994 Squire and Fastnow publish one of the first articles to look back to Gubernatorial races since 1982. Up to this point there had been much research in national elections. There is little direct fault in this, as national data was easily available and uniform in nature. The flaw, as they point out, was that the body of literature had assumed the results obtained from national elections were universally applicable to other elections (Squire and Fastnow, 1994) . But previous works had already laid the ground work for challenging this assumption, showing that incumbent reelection rates had remained even, bucking the national trend (Patterson, 1982 , Tompkins, 1984 . This would suggest state governor elections may have different characteristics than Congressional or Senate races (Squire and Fastnow, 1994 ).
Looking at a series of surveys and polls over the previous decade, they drew a general picture of gubernatorial elections designed to help future research. The first image was the obviously higher incumbent loss rate of governors compared to senators (Squire and Fastnow, 1994) . The second part was the overly high media exposure granted to incumbents. Using rough measures, such as counting the number of stories run in a given year mentioning a state's Governor compared to those mentioning the state's Senator. What they saw was that while senators got coverage on a national scale, governors are much more visible to the public through local press (Squire and Fastnow, 1994) . What this implies is that while senators may be able to get away with missteps or small scandals, governors do not get that chance. Since the governor is seen on a regular basis, their actions are taken much more personally by voters. This makes for much less loyal voters (Squire and Fastnow, 1994) . The third portion of the picture painted is the media and public acceptance of challengers. In most races challengers must spend large sums of money to get into the public light prior to garnering media attention. Squire and
Fastnow suggested the flip side of the spot light on the incumbent governor is the large attention paid to challengers (Squire and Fastnow, 1994) . This lowers their cost of entry into the political race and increases their chances of winning in the general election.
The implications of their work is to urge analysis of governor races separate from national elections. And, when doing so, to remember the apparent differences in the important factors impacting the election outcomes (Squire and Fastnow, 1994) . This analysis was expanded by Leyden and Borrelli the following year, looking at the effects of economic conditions and government unity on the election outcome.
Using data collected from gubernatorial elections from 1972-1990, they used a simple OLS model which does not account for spending to detect other variables which would be appropriate to include in further research (Leyden and Borrelli, 1995) . What they discovered is that a unified government 26 actually hurts the candidate whose party is in control. Also, enlighteningly, economic conditions such as unemployment are only significant to the candidate whose party is in control (Leyden and Borrelli, 1995) . Both of these articles provided a beginning frame work for gubernatorial election analysis.
At the same time, Ansolabehere and Gerber attempt to explain the seemingly contradictory assumptions that challenger spending impacts election outcomes and incumbent spending does not. The problem they identified with previous models was that aggregate expenditures were assumed to represent campaign spending 27 . They contend that rarely are all funds spent by a campaign actually spent campaigning (Ansolabehere and Gerber, 1994 Squire, 1995) , the primary issue of dealing with the endogenous nature of incumbent spending has not been settled 32 .
What this means is that most researchers agree on the basics, that challenger spending is more effective than incumbent, that spending exhibits diminishing returns and that incumbent spending is endogenous. The actual remaining points of contention lie in determining the functional form of spending returns and the appropriate 2SLS specification (Squire, 1995) .
Since there was no clear way to settle the simultaneity debate at the time, research turned to drawing policy implications from what information had already been determined (Goidel and Gross, 1996) . Goidel and Gross took four previously proposed models, those of Jacobson, Green and Krasno, Abramowitz and Goidel and Gross, and used them to determine the predicted effects they would have with certain campaign 29 This fact is obviously explained by the use of OLS instead of 2SLS. The endogenous nature of incumbent spending previously established (Jacobson, 1978 , Green and Krasno, 1988 shows that OLS would be biased and quite possible produce negative coefficients for incumbent spending. 30 This refers to those researchers who see incumbent spending as insignificant, at least in the sense of through statistical results. 31 This refers to those researchers who see incumbent spending as significant, both ideologically and statistically. 32 Bartels used the disagreement between Jacobson and Green and Krasno as an example of the dilemma of specifying simultaneous equations using 2SLS. Bartels could be considered an objective supporter of Jacobson's assertion that statistical methods are not at that point developed enough to handle incumbent spending. Krasno (1988, 1990) would argue with support from Thomas (1989) and Kenny and McBurnett (1994) that one can appropriately specify the 2SLS model. finance reforms. One significant change in the analysis they conducted was that they used both vote share (which was the literature norm) and a win/loss dummy variable (which has not been used) as response variables. In looking at proposed campaign spending limits, they saw that all four models predicted that the measure would either hurt challengers or have a neutral effect on the election results (Goidel and Gross, 1996) .
When looking at the proposal of matching funds raised, they discovered that high enough matching limits (those in the 300-600 thousand dollar range) would help challengers (Goidel and Gross, 1996) 33 . Finally, they looked at public funding of campaigns. This was the one reform which produced clear results in all four models. They showed a clear increase in challenger competition 34 (otherwise, a more competitive race overall) with public funding (Goidel and Gross, 1996) 35 .
In 1998 Gerber attempted to re-examine the simultaneity issue using Senate elections. Previous attempts to address endogenous incumbent spending used incumbent quality/experience, challenger spending and lagged incumbent spending (Jacobson, 1978, Green and Krasno, 1988) . The problem Gerber poses with these instruments was they were inappropriate given the nature of 2SLS (Gerber, 1998) . He argued that appropriate instruments are those that do not directly affect the response variable. Numerous literature has shown that challenger spending is significant and Krasno (1988, 1990 ) make strong arguments for candidate quality impacting the election outcome. This means those two variables are off limits for 2SLS analysis (Gerber, 1998 (Gerber, 1998) . This rationale follows his belief that incumbent spending is not as immediately responsive as many have contended 37 . If one can assume that incumbents choose broad spending targets prior to the election and any challenger spending, then Gerber claims lagged spending is all one would need (Gerber, 1998 ).
Gerber uses both OLS and 2SLS, comparing the results of each to summarize the effects of the instruments used. His OLS results showed that while both candidate's spending is significant, challenger spending has about twice the marginal effect of incumbent spending (Gerber, 1998) . This would support the traditional view of spending formed by Green and Krasno (1988) 38 . What Gerber discovered when running the identical 2SLS regression was that both candidate's spending was significant and marginally identical (Gerber, 1998) . This implies challengers have no spending advantages over incumbents.
36 This is a long standing argument outside the scope of this paper. Many believe that since Senators have one vote regardless of state size, special interests have a remarkable incentive to target incumbents with small states, as their spending givens more 'bang for their buck.' For more on this discussion one may refer to Hibbing and Brandes (1983) , Westlye (1991) and Krasno (1994) as cited in Gerber (1998) . 37 Jacobson (1985) , Green and Krasno (1990) and Kenny and McBurnett (199) supports the idea that incumbent spending is nearly immediately responsive to challenger spending, as measured by weeks or months. 38 Jacobson (1978 Jacobson ( , 1985 Jacobson ( , 1990 would agree with the premise that challenger spending is more effective, but would disagree with several aspects of the model; including the simultaneous functional form, no accounting for diminishing returns and many extraneous predictor variables.
He is careful to point out that these results, while robust, do not necessarily cross apply to other elected offices (Gerber, 1998 Mitchell decided to test this hypothesis by studying the New York City Mayoral democratic primary. The data they collected showed weekly polling data between the three top candidates and weekly contribution reports. Using time series analysis they attempted to match changes in polling results to changes in contributions (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell, 2000) . What they witnessed was a drastic increase in contributions to candidates as their approval (likelihood to vote for) rating difference with other candidates narrowed (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell, 2000 looking at both OLS and 2SLS using opposing candidate spending as an instrument, that both candidates had significant positive effects from campaign spending (Partin, 2002) .
Also, as an incumbent would be an in-party candidate, one could extrapolate that they also receive positive effects from spending 43 . This is the first work to show the effects of spending in gubernatorial elections and establishes a perspective that all candidates have equal spending benefits.
Up to this point in time the primary question with which I am concerned, that of whether campaign finance laws change campaign spending, has been primarily ignored. Goidel and Gross (1996) , as previously mentioned, do address the issue. But, their analysis was limited to measuring predictions given by previously proposed models and 41 Patterson (1982) , Tompkins (1984) and Squire and Fastnow (1994) have all looked at gubernatorial elections, but have instead focused on qualitative measures. These studies helped identify differences between governor elections and federal elections as well as potential significant variables for analysis. What they did not do, however, was regress any model including campaign expenditures on vote share. 42 By many regards this may be a more appropriate measure, as a large number of states during this time frame passed term limits of one or two terms. Analysis from the perspective of incumbent/challenger would miss the effects of the open contests which can obviously be impacted by the outgoing governor's policies and behavior. 43 Since an incumbency dummy variable was included in the model, it would be conceivable for one to pull incumbent spending from the model by adding an interaction term between the incumbent variable and spending. Why this was not done is not clearly explained.
did not include one of the most widely used regulations, that of contribution limits. It is little fault of the researchers, for analysis of this question is nearly impossible to conduct with national data. Since national data has been collected only since 1972, and set contribution limits have been in place since this time, there is no variation in laws to allow regression analysis of the data (Gross, Goidel and Shields, 2002) .
That is why Gross, Goidel and Shields decide to look at state level data to attempt to ascertain the effects of finance laws on election outcomes. This question was an important one as all previous literature had not directly addressed it (Jacobson, 1978 , Green and Krasno, 1988 , Gerber, 1998 . For instance, Jacobson concluded that any action that would increase money in elections would help challengers (Jacobson, 1985) . He therefore advocates increasing contribution limits. He does this believing this would increase the money in elections without any analysis as to whether his desired effect would occur. Gross, Goidel and Shields look at governor elections from 1978-1997 with a variety of finance laws to identify which ones, if any, actually impact the election outcome.
They used several different dependent variables for their analysis, looking at incumbent, challenger, Republican and Democrat vote share and the absolute difference in contributions between the two candidates. The results of their analysis were that spending limits with public financing and contribution limits were significant, increasing the competition in the race and reducing the absolute difference in contributions between the candidates (Gross, Goidel and Shields, 2002) . While these results were important as some of the first in their field, they are very limited in their application. The method of analysis chosen was OLS, which makes clear sense for the absolute difference in contribution dependent variable 44 . What they lack is justification for ignoring the simultaneity problem with incumbent spending 45 . Their own analysis shows that campaign finance laws impact contributions. This brings into question their regression results with the vote share dependent variables, as they have demonstrated collinearity in spending and finance laws.
Regardless of the questions surrounding their results, they do provide an important first look into the effects of regulation on elections. While the previous literature has obviously been remarkable in increasing our understanding of money in politics, it has provided little guidance for policy. Any recommendations made to increase electoral competition (which has been an assumed goal for most researchers)
have been made without understanding of policies effects on the amount of money in elections. Gross, Goidel and Shields (2002) provided a good starting point for further analysis into campaign finance laws.
At this same time, Coate took a different approach to the analyzing campaign laws. Instead of looking at electoral results, he attempted to establish a theoretical basis for contribution limits and public finance (Coate, 2004) . While he did not provide guidance as to the effectiveness in altering the amount of money in elections, he demonstrated the potential social benefits rarely considered, may justify regulations.
These benefits include increased public faith in their representatives while not reducing candidate quality. He labels this as a Pareto improvement as elective officials will owe fewer favors (or at least the public will perceive them to owe fewer favors) while candidates will still be able to signal their quality and qualifications through raising and spending money (Coate, 2004) .
III. Discussion of Eom and Gross
In their paper, "Contribution Limits and Disparity in Contributions between Gubernatorial Candidates," Eom and Gross posed two basic questions: 1) Do campaign finance laws affect the disparity between funds raised by gubernatorial candidates 46 ? and 2) Do campaign finance laws change political contributor's contribution habits? The dilemma presented by the answers proposed to these questions by Eom and Gross is that they seem to contradict each other. The goal of this paper will be to fix the disconnect between those answers.
Their study is based upon data from the National Institute on Money in State Politics which collected information on 57 gubernatorial elections taking place between 1990 and 2000 (Eom and Gross 2006) 47 . Using ordinary least squares they regressed several measures of contribution and spending disparity on an aggregated campaign finance law variable and several control variables 48 . The conclusion they reached, with regards to their first question, was that finance laws had no significant impact on the difference between contributions raised by incumbents and challengers. 46 This question implies no concern over the actual amount of money spent in any given election. Many legislatures have justified contribution limits on the grounds of reducing corruption, which is an issue not addressed here. This question is concerned with the proportional disparity between what an incumbent can raise and spend and what a challenger can. 47 It should be noted that this set of observations includes 27 elections which involved incumbents and is a non-random sample taken from the population of 156 gubernatorial elections which took place over that time period. 48 The nature of these variables and the model used will be discussed in greater detail later in the paper when we replicate their analysis.
One can understand taking a pause before accepting this unintuitive conclusion.
My concern is supported by the fact that Eom and Gross even conclude in their paper that particularistic contributors 49 tend to donate more to challengers and less to incumbents in a regulated setting leading one to believe, intuitively, that these laws should in some way decrease the disparity between candidates. If nothing else, our society has assumed up to this point that contribution limits have some type of positive impacts on electoral competition. So, considering the positive reception of the papers conclusions 50 I decided a critical review of their proposed model and results was warranted. In analyzing the paper I found three areas of contention 51 with the assumptions and processes used by Eom and Gross: 1) the number of observations in the sample used, 2) the characteristics of the sample used and 3) the use of an aggregated finance law independent variable.
The size of the data set used in their analysis presents several general problems.
While the entire set includes 57 elections, Eom and Gross break down their analysis into two areas; one concerning all the elections and another with just those elections involving an incumbent. As the general consensus is the greatest policy benefits can be derived from understanding the incumbent/challenger relationship I am most concerned with those results. The dilemma lies in the fact there are only 27 gubernatorial races included in the incumbent data set. The 14 degrees of freedom remaining from their study make any normality assumptions about the results hard to justify. First off, it is hard to justify 49 Those contributors who donate in order to influence resulting government policy. 50 The paper was cited in a US Supreme Court dissenting opinion in Randall v. Sorrell which concerned overturning Vermont campaign finance contribution and spending limits. 51 I in no way wish to assert these three are my only points of contention, but merely that these three are the most appropriate to address at this time in this format. While issues with endogeneity and model selection should be analyzed, and will be briefly discussed further in the paper, my primary goal is to initially test the model they propose in the 'best light possible' by making all possible corrections that still preserve the spirit of the model. It would be prudent to test these additional concerns in future work.
the predictive power of the outcomes of this model 52 . Second, there is no opportunity for sensitivity testing by including additional control variables, such as state fixed effects 53 .
Third, the limited degrees of freedom artificially increases the chance of failing to find a significant coefficient where one actually exists 54 .
The underlying structure of the data set also causes me to question the robustness of the model's results. This concern goes beyond the issues of the non-randomness of the included elections. What is seen is that 18 of the 27 incumbent/challenger election data points occurred in 1998. Also, as previously mentioned, only two states are repeated.
The results generated from this data are inherently biased toward the conditions in these states in one particular year. The cross-sectional nature of this data means the model is not picking up any variation in state finance laws over time, again granting little predictive power to the results. The results of that last regression explain the reason for previous models generating insignificant coefficients for campaign finance laws. The two laws had opposite effects, and by compressing them into one variable their effects were counteracted by each other. What is interesting is this result is supported by the results of Eom and Gross's analysis of particularistic and universalistic contributors. When using the ratio disparity measure and looking at only particularistic contributors, who they label as predominantly corporations, labor unions and PACs, they generated a significant negative coefficient. This implies laws restricting particularistic contributions disproportionately hurt incumbents, decreasing the disparity. This is the same substantive result from my analysis. As corporate contributors, who are inherently particularistic, are limited they spread their money out among more challengers than they would in an unregulated setting 63 .
V. Conclusions
There are two primary results to draw from this analysis. The first, which is academic in nature, emphasizes the need to always look at each type of campaign finance 62 It should be noted that we ran the model using the disaggregated finance variables without the state fixed effects. The results were all non-significant. 63 This conclusion would be supported by Box-Steffensmeier and Dow, 1992, This study is in no way the final authority on the effects of campaign finance laws. It is imperative to take a closer look at the effects of varying contribution limits, laws that limit the amount of spending in elections, public financing of elections and a host of other more specific areas before passing judgment. What I have done here is to provide a framework for beginning to seriously analyze this topic so we can better understand the potential effects of these laws before legislatures put them into action. 64 There is no guarantee that states always enact limit laws in this order. But, there is still an argument to be made that state generally adopt their limitation laws in that order.
